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THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF
THE GLOBAL TAX RESET
by
John Paul*

INTRODUCTION
Tax avoidance by multinationals as well as the creative
use of loopholes, has long been part of the global tax system.1
However, after the Great Recession (2007 to 2009), many
national governments faced extremely tight budgets and
extraordinarily high debt burdens2; therefore, there was huge
political pressure in the United States (U.S.) and Europe to
require large profitable multinationals such as Google, Apple
and Starbucks to pay their “fair share of taxes.”3
In response to the pressure, in 2013 the finance
ministers of the world’s largest nations, known as the G20,
initiated the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS)
Project, also referred to as “The Global Tax Reset.”4 BEPS
refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and
mismatches in tax laws to artificially shift profits to low or notax regions where there is little or no economic activity.5 The
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) tax experts at the BEPS Project were told to develop
principles to “ensure that profits are taxed where economic
activities generating the profits are performed and where value
is created.”6 They were also told to complete their work on an
accelerated schedule by the end of 2015.7
While there is evidence that international tax avoidance
and evasion8 may lead to a loss of billions in tax revenue,
which can adversely affect national economies,9 it is not clear
whether BEPS or the Global Tax Reset will alleviate or
exacerbate the problem. This paper will examine the history
and consequences of international tax avoidance as well as
analyze the principles and potential outcomes of the Global
Tax Reset.

HISTORY OF TAX AVOIDANCE
The idea of international tax avoidance probably started
in the U.S. and the British Empire.10 The “offshore”
phenomenon probably began in the U.S. when states such as
Delaware and New Jersey realized they could lure businesses
from more prosperous states by offering tax benefits on the
condition that those businesses register in their states.11 Then,
the first cases of international tax avoidance occurred in the
British Empire in the early 1900s when wealthy individuals
started to use offshore trusts in places like the British Channel
Islands to exploit the British principle of separation of tax
residence and domicile.12
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By the 1920s, the League of Nations helped design a
“Draft Model on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion.”13 After
that, the United Nations, and more recently, the OECD have
taken the lead in establishing model tax treaties and guidelines
that individual nations could adopt in their entirety or modify
in accordance with their own needs.14
In the 1930s, Switzerland offered “internationally
mobile people” residency, only requiring them to pay a fixed,
undisclosed amount of tax – not varying with income – each
year. Switzerland also contributed to international tax
avoidance with the use of banking secrecy, developed at the
time of the French Revolution but enshrined in Swiss law in
the 1930s.15 The Swiss felt that these measures gave them an
advantage as a small, land-locked nation in a hostile European
environment.16
At the current time, there are 72 tax havens around the
world with almost half of them being British territories,
dependencies or Commonwealth members.17 It appears that the
tax avoidance industry always seems to be outpacing the
governments. Elected governments take years to develop tax
laws but the accounting and law firms always seem to
undermine them within months of a public official’s budget
speech.18 Many accounting and law firms advise governments
on legislative design and enforcement, fueling the suspicion
that the tax avoidance industry and national governments are
often partners in facilitating international tax avoidance.19
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COSTS OF TAX AVOIDANCE
Taxes play a critical role in the development of an
equitable society.20 Progressive forms of taxation – income,
profit or capital-gains taxes – are the main ways in which
wealth is redistributed.21 Taxes are also a cornerstone of
democracy, giving individuals and business a financial stake in
society.22
Estimating how much tax avoidance and evasion cost
the U.S. Treasury is difficult.23 Some estimate it as being about
$50 billion a year.24 Former IRS Commissioner Rossotti says
the uncollected tax gap could be in the range of $250 to $300
billion per year, which is the equivalent of a 15 percent surtax
on the honest taxpayer.25
In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that there is an
annual loss of $170 billion in avoided taxes.26 Even in a
relatively wealthy nation, this sum is exorbitant when public
funds are scarce and people are becoming more reluctant to see
increased government spending on various programs.27
Tax avoidance adversely affects poor nations the
most.28 As an example, Bolivia is sitting on the gas and oil
reserves worth billions, yet it is the poorest nation in South
America. The contradiction between Bolivia’s grinding poverty
and the fact that companies such as British Gas and BP pay
relatively little tax for extracting Bolivia’s valuable resources
has not been lost on the Bolivian people: protests have toppled
two governments in two years.29 While Bolivia has enormous
wealth, millions of Bolivians live in horrible poverty. In El
Alto, a quarter of the population have no running water and
diseases such as dysentery and diarrhea are rampant.30
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Multinational companies such as British Gas and BP
can afford to pay higher taxes and still achieve high profits –
consider the case of Norway.31 In the 1950s, Norway was one
of the poorest nations in Europe. By the 1960s, substantial oil
and gas deposits were discovered in the Norwegian continental
shelf.32 The Norwegian government was able to improve the
nation’s financial position through an efficient tax system. The
average government take for a standard 100-million-barrel is
75 percent.33 This money is placed into the Norwegian
Government Petroleum Fund, which subsidizes the welfare
state, both now and in the future, after the reserves run out.34
Much of U.S. and European development policy in
Bolivia focused on aid and debt relief. But raising the tax on
extracting Bolivian gas would provide an enormous
development fund, similar to the one Norway maintains,
without costing the taxpayers a penny.35 The building of water
mains in Bolivia could be funded several times over.36
Furthermore, the U.S. provides debt relief of $44
million a year to Bolivia and Bolivia owes the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund over $2 billion.37 The
estimated total value of Bolivia’s gas reserves is $250 billion.
By imposing a larger tax on the extraction of its gas reserves,
Bolivia could pull itself out of poverty with no cost to the U.S.
and European taxpayers.38
Tax avoidance by multinational corporations are in a
unique position to use tax havens to avoid large amounts of tax
payments. Vast sums of money are put beyond the reach of tax
authorities.39 The world’s wealthiest individuals hold $11.5
trillion offshore. If the earnings of $11.5 trillion were taxed at a
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rate of 30 percent, it would raise an annual sum of $255 billion,
which more than three times the current global annual aid
budget.40

BEPS – THE GLOBAL TAX RESET
Due to rising economic and political pressures,
politicians from Europe and the U.S. strongly supported the
accelerated BEPS Project.41 The Obama Administration signed
onto the BEPS Project in the expectation that it would
strengthen the U.S. tax base and enable the federal government
to hold onto more corporate tax revenues.42
The BEPS Project aims to prevent base erosion and
profit shifting by having taxes paid in the jurisdiction where
profits are generated and value is created (i.e., substance).43
The BEPS Action Plan, published in 2013, has implemented
the following 15 action plans44:
1. Address the tax challenges of the digital economy
2. Neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements
3. Strengthen the controlled foreign companies (CFC)
rules
4. Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other
financial payments
5. Counter harmful tax practices more effectively taking
into account transparency and substance
6. Prevent treaty abuse
7. Prevent the artificial avoidance of permanent
establishment (PE) status

91 / Vol 36 / North East Journal of Legal Studies

8. Assure that that transfer pricing outcomes are in line
with value creation: intangibles
9. Assure that that transfer pricing outcomes are in line
with value creation: risks/capital
10. Assure that that transfer pricing outcomes are in line
with value creation: other high risk transactions
11. Establish methodologies to collect and analyze data on
BEPS and the action to address it
12. Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax
planning arrangements
13. Re-examine transfer pricing documentation
14. Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective
15. Develop a multilateral instrument
While the BEPS Project was initiated by the G20 nations, it
effectively also encompassed the other OECD Member States
from the beginning.45 As the project progressed, engagement in
discussions was extended to other large, non-OECD nations
and representatives from developing nations. The OECD
published over 1600 pages in final reports with regard to all 15
BEPS Action items in October 2015.46 The United Nations,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and OECD are all
developing toolkits to assist “low-income nations” in
implementing the outcomes of the BEPS Project.47
One of the cornerstones of the BEPS Project is Action
13 or Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR).48 In general,
CbCR is required in the nation where the ultimate parent
company has its tax residence. If this nation has not
implemented CbCR, multinational enterprises (MNE) may be
required to file in the nations where they conduct business.
Specifically, Action 13 recommendations require MNEs with
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global turnover of 750 million euros ($835,845,000) or more in
the preceding fiscal year to submit a CbCR report each year in
every jurisdiction in which they conduct business.49 This report
would contain financial information with regard to each nation
where the MNE operates, such as types of activities conducted,
local turnover, taxes paid, assets and number of employees.
The primary goal of Action 13 is to align profits with value
creation and substance.50
On June 28, 2016, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
and the Treasury issued final country-by-country regulations
that will apply to U.S persons that are the ultimate parent
entities of a MNE that has annual revenue for the preceding
annual accounting period of $850,000,000 or more.51 The
regulations will apply to reporting periods that begin on or after
the first day of a taxable year that begins on or after June 30,
2016.52

PROBLEMS WITH BEPS
While the purpose of BEPS may be to reduce the most
egregious forms of tax planning,53 many believe that it may
only exacerbate the problems of international tax avoidance.54
The result of the new requirements will be to impose
significant new burdens on MNEs because of the
administrative difficulties involved in preparing the BEPS
templates and dealing with audit activity initiated by nations
due to information reported on them.55 MNEs will also face the
administrative requirement of reconciling public financial
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statements, legal entity books, local tax returns, and the
templates.56
An additional concern with CbCR reporting is
confidentiality – many MNEs and practitioners believe that at
least some taxing jurisdictions will make the information
reported publicly available or that the information will be
leaked to the public57 For the first time, taxing officials
throughout the world will be able to determine how MNEs
allocate their income and tax payments to a specific nation and
other nations too. The BEPS template will serve as a tool for
taxing officials to identify and select companies to be audited.58
These audits can be used as political leverage against MNEs
who don’t wish to follow certain objectionable practices in a
particular jurisdiction.59
This problem can be solved to some extent by requiring
nations to establish legal protections to preserve the
confidentiality of the CbCR reporting. Also, there could be a
legal requirement that the BEPS template will only be used to
assess potential high-level BEPS-related risks.60
While the administrative burdens required by BEPS are
a problem, the biggest problem with BEPS is that tax experts
and even the OECD itself agree that the principles on which
the current international tax system was designed is based on
what the world and companies looked like around a 100 years
ago.61 Today, more than a third of all international trade is
intra-company trade – different subsidiaries with an MNE
buying goods and services from each other. This allows money
to be easily shifted around with big companies, often using
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subsidiaries in tax havens, so as to avoid paying taxes as much
as possible.62
Many developing nations see MNEs move money out
of their jurisdictions because the current international tax
regime makes it perfectly legal to do so. 63 A 2015 study
released by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development estimates that companies owned from conduit
companies and tax havens avoid paying $100 billion in taxes
each year by shifting profits out of developing nations.64
Some of the challenges faced by developing nations,
such as transfer mispricing, excessive interest payments on
intracompany loans and hybrid mismatches (exploitation of
differences between nations’ tax laws) are addressed by BEPS.
However, the recommendations are (1) resource-intensive (e.g.,
the transfer pricing recommendations); (2) filled with
exemptions that weaken the effectiveness (e.g., intra-company
loans); and (3) not designed with developing nations in mind
(e.g., minor changes suggested to anti-tax haven legislation).65
All of this means that it will be difficult for poor nations to
implement the BEPS recommendations66 and even if they do,
they probably won’t collect that much more tax revenue as a
result.67
One problem that BEPS does not address is tax
competition. While BEPS may broaden the tax base in some
nations, it doesn’t address the race to the bottom for low
corporate income tax rates and big tax giveaways though larger
tax exemptions.68 In fact, BEPS could create even more
competition as nations that can no longer offer the kinds of
schemes targeted by BEPS will look for other ways to cut their
tax rates.69
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If the tax problems of developing nations are to be
addressed, then other solutions are needed. These include: (1)
allowing more representation of developing nations on
international tax rules; (2) allowing unilateral developing
nation actions (e.g., developing national and regional
approaches as opposed to the preferred international
approaches); and (3) developing national frameworks for how
to negotiate tax treaties to ensure that no taxing rights are
unfairly handed away.70
RECENT INTERNATIONAL TAX REPERCUSSIONS
In recent years, multinational officials have attempted
to stamp out sweetheart tax deals that nations strike with global
companies, including U.S. tech giants.71 Taxation is one of the
many issues that have placed U.S. tech companies at odds with
European officials and a recent notable example of this would
be the case of Apple Inc. (“Apple”).72
In August of 2016, the European Commission ruled that
Apple has received illegal state aid through its advanced
pricing agreements with Ireland.73 Apple and Ireland believe
the advanced pricing agreements conform to Irish and
European Union law and the Irish government has agreed to
appeal the ruling.74
According to the European Commission ruling, the
selective tax treatment of Apple in Ireland is illegal under
European Union state aid rules because it gives Apple a
significant advantage over other businesses that are subject to
the same national tax laws.75 Consequently, the ruling requires
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Ireland to recover the unpaid taxes in Ireland from Apple for
years 2003 to 2014 of up to $14 billion, plus interest.76
Many see the Apple ruling as an example of the global
trend to emphasize substance.77 Action 5 of the BEPS Final
Reports recommends that taxing jurisdictions limit preferential
intellectual property regimes to companies that can
demonstrate a certain level of substance in the nation.78 In that
regard, the European Commission’s ruling against Ireland and
Apple focus on the lack of substance with regard to the “main
office” allocation of profits.79
The U.S. Treasury (“the Treasury”) takes a different
view on the Apple ruling. The Treasury has stated: (1) that the
European Commission’s actions undermine U.S. efforts in
developing transfer pricing norms and implementing the BEPS
project; and (2) call into question the ability of Member States
to honor their bilateral tax treaties with the U.S.80 Furthermore,
the Treasury has expressed the concern that adopting new
enforcement regimes with retroactive effect will: (1) hinder
companies’ ability to assess risks and plans for the future; and
(2) sets an unwelcome precedent for tax authorities around the
world to take similar retroactive actions that could adversely
affect both U.S. and European Union companies.81
In light of these concerns, many believe that the
European Commission’s ruling may prompt non-European
Union nations to change their taxing regimes in order to lure
companies like Apple and others.82 For example, the United
Kingdom could cut corporate tax rates, and make other tax
changes, in order to attract major multinational companies. If
this occurs, this would validate the Treasury’s concerns as
various jurisdictions may abandon BEPS in favor of luring
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multinational corporations, such as Apple, with attractive tax
regimes.83

CONCLUSION
There is no question that international tax avoidance is
a huge problem and many needy people in developed and
developing nations are suffering as a result of the tax revenue
lost due to tax avoidance schemes. The need to address
international tax avoidance is what initiated BEPS – The
Global Tax Reset.
While BEPS does address some of the issues of
international tax avoidance; overall, it may be creating more
administrative burdens without addressing the core issues of
international tax avoidance.
In order to more effectively solve the problems incurred
by international tax avoidance, developing nations need to be
include on a larger scale in the formulation of international tax
rules and be allowed to take more unilateral actions based on
their current resources and situations. It appears that solutions
based on international frameworks never seem to be effective;
therefore, allowing more national and regional approaches
could lead to a more concise and appropriate solution to the
unique tax issues that characterize each nation. The recent
European Commission ruling in the case of Apple and Ireland
indicates that the European Union may be adopting a more
regional approach to addressing international tax issues,
thereby undermining BEPS for the time being.
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